

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1963

Mrs. Lincoln:

This is State Department's response to the President's request for an unclassified statement of current Cuban policy which could be given to Congressmen when they ask how they should reply to constituents' questions.

Mr. Bundy has cleared this statement.

Discuss with Bundy
Should be 1, 2, 3, 4
Bromley Smith

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STATEMENT OF CUBAN POLICY

Our objective is a truly free Cuba. We want to get rid of Castro and the Communist influence there. In advancing toward that objective, we are executing essentially a two-front policy with respect to Cuba: on the one hand, we are moving to weaken Castro with a view to his eventual collapse; on the other, we are strengthening the Latin American countries which he and his Soviet masters are intent upon capturing. Our policy is progressing. We face, however, a long hard road, and the end is not in sight.

We are pursuing courses of action designed: to effect the withdrawal of Soviet military forces in Cuba and to maintain surveillance of Cuba to ensure that it does not become a military threat to the U.S. or its allies in this hemisphere; to persuade the Soviets that their support of Cuba is not in their best interest; to increase the isolation of the Castro regime, to aggravate its serious economic difficulties; to block Cuban-based and supported subversion of Latin American governments; and to prevent by whatever means may be necessary any aggressive Cuban action or threat of force against any part of the Western Hemisphere.

Our actions have brought the following results:

Economic

Cuba has been substantially isolated from the economic life of the West. Free World trade has declined from \$1.3 billion in 1959 to an estimated \$247 million in 1962, a decline of 83 percent. A series of measures which the United States took between July 1960 and February 1962 resulted in the embargo of all trade with Cuba except for the export on humanitarian grounds of certain foods and medicines, and resulted in a drop in total United States trade with Cuba from \$881 million in 1959 to \$7.2 million in 1962, of which \$6.5 million entered the United States during the first three months due to commitments made before the embargo.

The number of Free World ships calling at Cuban ports has dropped sharply from 352 ships in the first quarter of 1962 to 59 during the same period of 1963. Most of these vessels are on long-term charter to the Soviet Bloc. There is no scheduled Free World passenger ship service to Cuba.

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The only regular Free World air service to Cuba is provided by two monthly flights of Iberia airlines. The only other commercial air link between Cuba and the Free World is the twice-weekly flights by the Cuban airlines, Cubana, from Habana to Mexico City.

Political

A major reduction of Castro influence in the West has been achieved. The Castro Government has been suspended from participation in the Organization of American States. Fifteen American Republics have severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. West Germany, which broke diplomatic relations in January 1963, is the latest Government to have taken such a step.

Security

Our Armed Forces are committed to insure that Cuba does not pose a threat to the security of this country or the hemisphere. This means prohibition of the return of offensive weapons to Cuba, maintenance of surveillance to assure ourselves and others that such an offensive capability is not present, enforcement of the free use by United States citizens of international air space and waters in the Caribbean, interdiction of arms shipments or other forays from Cuba aimed at other countries, and insurance against the use of Soviet troops against Cubans in any internal reaction against the Castro regime.

The United States has developed a detailed program to deal with Castro/ Communist efforts to promote subversion in Latin America. We are working actively with individual nations and through the OAS and other regional forums to reduce the capacity of the Cuban Government to disrupt the political order and economic progress of the hemisphere.

We have concentrated our efforts on countering (1) Cuban efforts to indoctrinate and train selected Latin Americans in the techniques of subversion and guerrilla warfare; (2) the movement of Cuban propaganda; (3) the supply of arms and other equipment from Cuba to Latin American terrorists and insurrectionaries; and, (4) the movement of funds to and within Latin American countries.

The problem of Communist subversion was thoroughly discussed by President Kennedy and the Isthmian Presidents at their meeting at San Jose, Costa Rica on March 18-20. As a consequence, the respective ministers responsible for internal security met at Managua, Nicaragua

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on April 3-4 to develop common measures to control subversive activities. At that meeting the ministers agreed to recommend to their governments the taking of steps to: (1) prohibit travel to Cuba of Latin Americans for training in subversion; (2) impede clandestine movement of arms into the Isthmian countries; (3) prevent the introduction of subversive Communist propaganda materials; (4) establish a cooperative system of surveillance to impede clandestine movement of persons, propaganda materials and arms for subversive purposes; (5) establish organizations in each country to counteract Communist subversion in the Isthmus; and (6) to consult further on ways to combat subversion.

The Council of the Organization of American States, acting under the Punta del Este decision of January 1962, is maintaining vigilance over Cuban attempts at aggression and subversion in the hemisphere. On the basis of a report on subversion by the experts of the Special Consultative Committee on Security, the Council of the OAS is now preparing a series of recommendations to the member governments which will include specific measures for control of travel to and from Cuba for subversive purposes. In these multilateral efforts, as well as in bilateral approaches to the countries, the United States has pledged material and moral support.

Through the Alliance for Progress we are endeavoring, in cooperation with the Latin American governments, to eradicate the social, economic and political conditions in which Communism flourished before Castro and in which, unless corrected, it will continue to flourish long after Castro is gone. By enhancing the internal security capabilities of police and military forces in Latin America, we are helping those governments meet and overcome the threat of Communist subversion and violence.

Finally, a testament to the failure of the Castro regime in Cuba is the mass exodus of Cuban citizens. At least 300,000 have fled their homeland since the Castro regime came to power; 600,000 more have indicated they want to leave.